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Trade: Sub-Saharan Africa's Engine of Decline
Sub-Saharan Africa is exceedingly dependent on external trade. This is not so 
much because of a high ratio of external trade to production but because most 
imports: e.g. food and drugs, fuel and industrial inputs, transport equipment
and agricultural inputs are vital to the operation - let alone development - 
of African economies and cannot yet be produced domestically in most
countries. In some this also holds true for many basic consumer goods.
Merchandise trade for SSA by 1983 had become only slightly unbalanced - about 
$40,000 million of imports ($100 per capita) versus $37,500 million of
exports. This however is grossly misleading. First, adding the deficit on
imported services and the debt service due - each about $10,000 million - left 
a financing gap of $22,500 million or 60$ of exports. Second, over 1980-83 
imports had been cut by virtually a third below the levels necessary to 
sustain, let alone increase output per capita for the region. Third, for many 
countries the situation was very much worse. For example, as of 1983
Tanzania's estimated merchandise imports needed to operate the economy at a 5% 
growth rate ($1,200 million) and debt service due ($350 million) were almost 
four times its actual merchandise exports of about $400 million.
Over 1984-1986 this position deteriorated substantially. Import volume rose 
slightly and import cost less rapidly because of oil price falls. Export 
volume rose more rapidly but - especially in 1986 - price falls converted this 
into static or falling export earnings. While grant aid rose, lending fell 
and repayments rose so that for SSA as a whole arrears continued to rise and 
external reserves to fall. In a few cases, e.g. Ghana, Tanzania, Mozambique, 
post 1983 import rises made possible primarily by concessional resource 
transfer increases have outstripped export rises - especially in 1987 - but in 
general the worsening current external balance position represents not more 
aid but less ability to make trade provide minimum necessary quantities of 
imports.
The most basic and general purpose of exports is to finance imports. 
Inability to import enough is strangling SSA's economies. Import cuts cause 
multiple losses of domestic output because - e.g. in manufacturing - for every 
dollar of operating inputs and spares cut, up to five dollars of local labour,
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raw materials and services cannot be used. Similarly hunger, unemployment and 
disease burgeon because Africa cannot import enough to produce and cannot 
import more because it cannot pay.
How Did This Happen?
First, for many African exports the world price trends since the middle 1970s 
have been such as to cut the quantity of imports a tonne of exports will buy 
by 50 to 70%. Second, partly because of price falls quantity produced fell - 
about 10# for agricultural and mineral exports between 1970 and 1980. 1980-86
volume increases of the order of 20# were more than wiped out by price falls 
so that while export volume reached new highs in 1986 even nominal export 
earnings (let alone import capacity) were lower than in 1980. Third, the over 
20 year old trend failure of African food production to keep pace with 
population growth - made worse by 1970—74, 1980-85 and 1987-?? drought cycles 
- has raised import needs. Fourth, few SSA governments have had and held to 
strategies of export development adequate to meet import requirements. Prices 
for traditional exports paid to producers in the 1970’s usually have been too 
low relative to export values and while now higher on that test have risen
little in real purchasing power terms because of export price falls and
efforts to develop non-traditional exports too little, too late and too 
fragmentary.
Export More? Import Less?
African states have no real option except to import more and to reduce the 
ratio of imports to output. Export promotion and import substitution are not 
alternative but complementary strategies.
Import substitution should in most cases be focused on food, on energy (e.g.
coal, hydroelectricity, natural gas even if there is no oil), on construction
materials and on basic consumer goods and agricultural inputs which can be 
produced largely from local raw materials.
However, without increased exports, that will not solve SSA’s trade problems. 
No rational capacity utilisation, restructuring or expansion strategy can be
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articulated which does not require import levels substantially above those now 
financeable and growing over time. The question is not whether to export but 
how and what to export. One answer is more traditional exports - at least 
restoring lost volume. But for many of these products more exports mean less 
revenue for SSA as a whole because the demand is inelastic and growing slowly. 
So if all SSA economies try this route, all will have less, not more, export 
earnings, indeed arguable that is what has happened over 19 81 — 1987- A second 
group are non-traditional natural resource based exports, e.g. pulp and paper, 
iron and steel, ammonia and urea from natural gas. The problems are 
identifying potential and financing development. A third cluster are 
processed or manufactured forms of present raw material exports, e.g. leather, 
shoes, lumber, furniture, copper wire and cable, instant coffee, cloth and 
garments. In many cases this route could raise export earnings 50% or more 
but there are serious protectionist and quota barriers - the best known being 
the Multi Fibre Agreements restricting textile and garment exports. Last are 
labour intensive manufactures, but these require very cheap, relatively 
skilled labour which is not, in fact, available in most SSA economies.
The case for raising exports is not in most cases that they can provide a 
general engine of export led growth for SSA economies. It is that imports are 
essential to operate, maintain, restructure and expand SSA economies. Unless 
they can be financed at higher levels than over 1981 —87 recovery, let alone 
restructuring to domestic (or intra African trade) led growth and development 
will be impossible to start or will be choked by literal import strangulation. 
Given the poor prospects for enhanced net resource inflows (from higher grants 
and soft loans and from debt relief), and the need for more African control 
over their own economic policy, these added imports need to be financed by 
higher export earnings. Even if debt relief and other soft finance is 
forthcoming on a larger scale than now seems likely (as Africa has a right to 
expect and as the global community implicity contracted to provide at the 1985 
UN General Assembly session on Africa), added exports are needed to reduce 
future requirements and to avoid total aid dependence.
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Trade Barriers and African Exports
In each of the areas cited African states and producers can do much to raise 
production - indeed must do so if the goods to export are to exist. But 
without trade reform such efforts are likely to yield very poor rewards.
Protectionism in the North is rising. Quotas and related restrictions on 
textiles and garments are creeping cancerously to other simple manufactures, 
to iron and steel and more widely. They preserve a few jobs for a few years 
in the North (at a very high cost to consumers and taxpayers). To Africa they 
pose nearly insuperable barriers to diversifying into processed exports. Even 
the threat of such barriers deters making the heavy investment needed to 
export leather (much less belts, handbags and shoes) instead of hides and 
skins. In the case of EEC there are few present quotas but as under the 
EEC/ACP agreement the EEC could impose them unilaterally, doubts persist as to 
how open that door is.
Related to this are escalating tariffs, zero on raw materials but rising with 
the stage of processing. These distort real costs and keep processing in the 
North even when economic logic would move it to Africa where it is desperately 
needed to bolster exports, employment and the overall manufacturing sectors. 
Again EEC is an exception as all SSA states are now ACP members and free of 
duties on exports to EEC.
Third is the combination of protection and dumping used to defend temperate 
agricultural production by large, high cost farmers especially in the EEC 
where most farmers may be poor but most CAP (Common Agricultural Policy) 
benefits go to rich farmers. Beet sugar cannot compete on cost terms with 
efficiently grown cane refined in the producing country. Yet over half world 
production is beet and most cane sugar is shipped raw, not refined. Similar 
protective barriers affect grain and meat exporters or potential exporters 
(e.g. Zimbabwe, Malawi, Botswana, Swaziland). To add insult to injury the EEC 
produces huge surpluses of sugar and meat which it dumps (subsidises exports) 
gravely reducing the prices African exporters receive in non-EEC markets.
Two further sets of trade barriers hamper African exports - those of other 
developing countries and their own against each other. While the present 
volume of intra African and other South directed African exports - other than
petroleum from Nigeria, Angola and to a lesser degree Cameroon, Gabon, Congo 
and Zaire - is small, in the absence of these barriers it would probably have 
better growth prospects than do North bound exports.
Trade Reform: Some African Priorities
The Northern trade reforms Africa needs are relatively easy to list:
1. phasing out of quotas over a definite time period, e.g. ending MFA 
restrictions on textiles and garments over 1 9 9 0 - 9 5 instead of tightening 
them every five years;
2 . removing discriminatory cascade or tier tariffs which distort the 
economically logical location of processing and lock African economies 
into exporting the raw or slightly processed form;
3. radically revising the CAP to protect small farmers but to reduce 
subsidies to large, ending the production of surpluses which are then 
dumped to the detriment of African (and other South) producers and 
increase duty free quotas for African exports of CAP covered products. 
Special attention in both cases should be paid to sugar, beef, vegetable 
oils, citrus fruit and tobacco.
If acted on, these three changes - the first two of which should be, but are 
not, everyone's priorities for the next MFA renegotiation and ongoing GATT
(General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs) round and the latter high on the EEC 
reform agenda - could create conditions compatible with fairly high (perhaps 4 
to 5Í a year growing to 6Í after a decade) African export growth rates.
Action in respect to African regional and broader South-South trade 
development is basically an African (and Southern) responsibility involving 
complex issues rather different from those sketched above. However, greater 
Northern technical assistance and trade finance fund capital grants to African 
regional groupings seeking to expand intra African trade and asking for such 
assistance (e.g. the Southern African Development Coordination Conference) 
could be a useful catalyst.
Commercial Reform; Stabilility and Participation
The impact of falling commodity prices on the real value of African exports 
(the imports they will buy) has already been mentioned. Commodity agreements 
to stabilise these prices have - except perhaps for coffee - been relatively 
unsuccessful. One reason is hostility by Northern economy governments. If it 
is accepted that price stability is a good thing for Northern farmers and that 
the way to handle the steel industry crisis is to manage output not cut 
prices, it is absurd to argue in principle against export quotas and reserve 
stocks to do the same for tropical commodities. Serious attempts to find 
solutions to commodity price stabilisation problems might not ensure they 
would be found. The present scarcely (or not at all in the US case) hostility 
to commodity agreements does guarantee that there will be no solutions 
achieved.
African states suffer in marketing their products from lack of participation 
in marketing, inadequate information and - in the case of plantation and 
mineral products produced by foreign firms (TNCs and others) and sold to 
associates - transfer pricing. All of these market imperfections are well 
documented.
African states - including their private enterprise sectors - need to be more 
active in marketing by auction, by direct sale to manufacturers and 
wholesalers, through brokers and merchants owned by themselves. They also 
need to develop better data collection channels to determine whether they are 
getting fair prices or being ripped off, e.g. by rings rigging auctions or TNC 
subsidiaries or management contractors selling to associated companies at 
sweetheart prices. All of these changes are toward freer and less imperfect 
markets and more competition. One might, therefore, expect that Western 
governments and international funding agencies would be quick to provide data 
system, technical, personnel and financial assistance. Such, unfortunately is 
not now the case.
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What Does It Matter?
To many African economies it can make the difference between ability to raise 
output faster than population and inability to raise it at all. To many 
Africans it can mean the difference between access to basic services (health, 
education and water), basic consumer goods and a minimally adequate diet or 
lack of access to any of these. In years of drought or particularly bad world 
economic conditions, the difference will for some hundreds of thousands of 
human beings be even starker - life of death.
For the Northern economies and their citizens the material differences will be 
much less. But they exist. Unless SSA can export more its imports from the 
North will continue to shrink, thus acting as a brake on Northern output and 
income growth. If the present strains continue, more and more African 
external debt will go into arrear and eventually into default. No one SSA 
state is a major debtor but the regional total is over $ 1 2 5 , 0 0 0 billion, that 
is more than Mexico or Brazil.
However, especially for members of UNA the real answer may lie in John Donne's 
best known lines:
No man is an island...
Ask not for whom the bell tolls 
It tolls for thee.
For many SSA economies the tocsin has been ringing ever more stridently for 
over five years; for scores and hundreds of thousands of poor Africans each 
year the collapse of their continents' trade position means - quite literally 
- the premature tolling of the passing bell.
Some Questions For Reflection And Discussion
1 . Why are exports so critical to African economies?
2. How have import cuts forces by export falls affected SSA since 1979?
3 . Why have African exports performed so badly?
Is protectionism - by tariff and by quota - against African beef and 
sugar, garments and textiles, leather and leather products, grain and 
tobacco, lumber and furniture, citrus fruit and fish, vegetable and 
margarine justified? Is dumping surplus sugar, beef and grain generated 
by CAP? If so why?
If it is not justified what should be done at future MFA renegotiations? 
In the ongoing GATT round? In EEC's CAP reform?
Should stability for tropical commodity prices be sought (as is done for 
European agricultural producer and steel mill prices)? If so what can be 
done to revive commodity agreements?
Should African countries and enterprises be assisted to make markets more 
competitive and to benefit more from them by doing more of their own 
marketing and improving their sources of commercial information?
What does it all matter to African economies? To Africans? To Northern 
economies? To us as UNA members?
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